

Donor-Derived Infections in Transplantation

What Are We Missing?

Jay A. Fishman, M.D.

Transplant and Immunocompromised Host Program


MGH Transplant Center

Massachusetts General Hospital, Harvard Medical
School



MASSACHUSETTS
GENERAL HOSPITAL

TRANSPLANT CENTER



Conflicts: Consultant for Primera, Inc.

You get a 3AM Phone Call...

- 42 year old deceased donor thought to have had cardiac arrest
- Had URI (upper respiratory infection) in week prior to death. No antiviral therapy.
- H1N1-2009 influenza (“swine flu”) swab pending
- Do you want to use the organs?

Sensitivity of QuickVue Influenza A+B Test (Rapid Antigen) Compared to RT-PCR

	Sensitivity	Specificity
Novel H1N1	20/39 (51%)	99%
Seasonal H1N1	12/19 (63%)	99%
Seasonal H3N2	6/19 (31%)	99%

Faix et al. NEJM 2009;361:728-29

What are the key questions?

- How often do clinically significant infections result from transmission of donor-derived pathogens?
- Which pathogens?
- How good are the current “approaches” to screening of organ donors?
- How can these be improved?
 - Bigger list? (more pathogens)
 - Better assays? (molecular vs. serologic)
 - Better communication of positive results? (TTSN, DTAG)
 - More flexibility?
 - New pathogens (outbreaks)
 - Regional variability (endemic pathogens)
 - Donor epidemiologic history (travel, immigration)

How often do clinically significant infections result from transmission of donor-derived pathogens?
Which pathogens do we care about?

- The types and significance of infection in transplant recipients is dependent on the type/intensity of immunosuppression, underlying immune deficits, the presence or absence of pre-existing immunity.
- The “importance” is a reflection of the morbidity and mortality associated with the disease and the availability (toxicity) of therapy – in transplant recipients

How often do clinically significant infections result from transmission of donor-derived pathogens?
Which pathogens do we care about?

- Answer: We do not know how often transmission occurs, with or without clinical signs.
- In general, infection due to viruses and parasites may be of greater concern than those due to bacteria or fungi due to **the greater incidence of symptomatic infection, limited microbiologic testing and the relative absence of effective or non-toxic therapies.**

Uncommon but not unique events!

- **Lymphocytic choriomeningitis** (LCMV, hamsters and rodents) → 4 outbreaks (3 in USA, 1 arenavirus in Australia) with 9 deaths
- **Rabies virus** (bat bite) → 2 known outbreaks with 5 deaths in USA, Germany
- **West Nile virus** (mosquitoes and birds) → now less common but 2002-2003 outbreak with 4 infections 1 death, 3 encephalitis, 2 with some permanent neurological damage
- **Chagas' Disease** (*Trypanosoma cruzi*) multiple transmissions
- **HIV** – now rare but 2 recent outbreaks (US and Italy)

Common Features

- Donor dying of possibly unrelated acute neurologic event (CVA, hemorrhage) – or undiagnosed meningoencephalitis
- Donor with unknown epidemiologic history (pet hamster, bat exposure, homelessness)
- Uncommon virus (organism) with increased virulence in immunocompromised hosts and/or unavailable testing
- Urgency for transplantation?
- Use of induction therapy for transplantation; “improved” immunosuppression?

Why new pathogens?


- Prolonged survival (travel, employment)
- Shifts in nosocomial flora (antimicrobial resistance), prolonged hospitalizations
- Intensified Immune suppression
- Improved diagnostic assays (molecular)
- Organ Shortage? (Expanded criteria donors?)
- Broader geographic backgrounds of donors & recipients

Detecting Pathogens in Organ Donors: The Challenges

- Immune suppression – infection is at least four to five times (possibly more) more likely in the transplant recipient than in normal individuals (i.e., sentinels for infection)
- Broader social and geographic/travel backgrounds of donors & recipients
- Need improved diagnostic assays (molecular) with sensitivity greater than for normal hosts

Wilck M, Fishman JA. The Challenges of Infection in Transplantation: Donor-derived infections. *Current Opinion in Organ Transplantation* 10:301-306, 2005.

Anti-Thymocyte Globulins and CD4+ T-cell Depletion



- *CD4/CD8 ratio remains persistently inverted*

Types of Infection Transmitted with Allograft Transplantation

- Bacterial infection: bacteremia or infection of tissues - resistance
- Fungus: fungemia or colonization - resistance
- Parasites: latent or acute infections - epidemiology
- Viruses: latent infection and viremia – diagnostic assays
- Prions: infection – not yet?

Donor-Derived Infection: Bacteria

- Bacteremia at the time of procurement due to (e.g.): Line infection, Sepsis, Pneumonia, Peritonitis, Meningitis
 - Rare transmission notably when prophylactic antimicrobials “cover” organisms
 - **Increasingly, antimicrobial-resistant organisms– Pseudomonas, Salmonella, MRSA, VRE**
 - Risk greatest at anastomotic site (vascular, tracheal, ureteric, GI, biliary) or hematomas (“Sticky organisms”)
- Tuberculosis: notably in endemic regions

Donor-Derived Infection: Fungi

- *Candida* – often nosocomial in donor (lines) or peritonitis (bowel) – antimicrobial selection in donor or recipient
- *Aspergillus* – fungemia uncommon but colonization common (lungs, sinuses)
- Endemic – *Histoplasma*, *Coccidioides*
 - Note: organ sharing may obscure endemic history
- Ubiquitous – *Cryptococcus* (pulmonary nodule)



Donor-Derived Infection: Candida

- 59 yo man and 47 yo woman received uneventful deceased donor renal transplants from same donor from outside the region
 - Thymoglobulin induction
 - Tacrolimus, MMF, prednisone taper
- Notified day 3 that donor had urinary yeast infection with *Candida* species
- Patients placed on fluconazole prophylaxis
- Male returned one week after transplant with fever and perinephric fluid collection = *Candida glabrata* (resistant to fluconazole, S micafungin). Other recipient with similar abscess (asymptomatic). Both surgically drained, responded well to therapy.

Donor-derived Parasites

- Late, latent infection
 - *Toxoplasma gondii* (hearts, lungs)
- Active infections (blood or organ)
 - **Chagas' Disease** (*Trypanosoma cruzi*)
 - Malaria – not accelerated in transplantation
 - Babesia – hemolysis
- Not yet described in recipients, but likely
 - *Strongyloides stercoralis*
 - *Leishmania donovani*
 - *T. brucei* – African sleeping sickness
- Not yet described & not T-cell dependent:
 - Intestinal/Liver flukes-*Opisthorcis/Clonorchis*
 - *Echinococcus*

Donor-derived Chagas' Disease after Cardiac Transplantation



Courtesy of B. Kubak

Donor-Derived Viruses

- Herpesviruses – CMV, EBV, HHV6, HSV, VZV
- HTLV I and II
- HIV
- West Nile Virus – mosquitoes and birds
- Rabies – bat bite
- LCMV – hamsters and rodents
- Respiratory Viruses: influenza (swine, avian), adenovirus, SARS coronavirus, metapneumovirus?
- Risks of Xenotransplantation – Porcine Endogenous Retrovirus, others?

Current Donor Screening

- **Social History** (to exclude “high-risk behaviors” for HIV only) - accuracy?
- **Blood, urine cultures** – useful for acute infections (results available after implantation)
- **Serologies** – generally useful for risk of post-organ transplant infection, but not acute infections syphilis, HIV, CMV, EBV, HSV, VZV, HBV, HCV, (Toxoplasma)
- **PCR & Antigen Tests** – useful (e.g., P24, viral load) but not (currently) adapted to speed needed or the array of potential infections

There is a marked organ shortage

- Organs must be used in 4-24 hours after procurement → Testing/screening must be available 24/7/365 (who pays?)
- **CANNOT waste organs due to FALSE + ASSAYS or “possibly” infected organs**
- Need to close the “window period” (i.e., pre-conversion) of serologic testing AND have the flexibility to provide assays for new pathogens (e.g., West Nile)

Transmission Events Reported to UNOS/OPTN/DTAG

Pathogen	Clinically Significant?
Histoplasma	Yes
Cryptococcus	Yes, No
Candida species	Yes
VRE, MRSA	Yes
Toxoplasma	Yes
T. cruzi	Yes
LCMV	Yes
CMV	Yes
Listeria	not transmitted (donor culture)
Influenza A	No
Tuberculosis	Yes, No
West Nile Virus	False + assay
HIV	Yes; Also false + assay (x2)

Screening vs Diagnostic tests

- Clinical trials to support **donor screening** tests perform testing in a “pre-screened”, low-prevalence population (emphasis on sensitivity). Result: more false positives than false negative results.
- Clinical trials to support **diagnostic** tests generally perform testing in a symptomatic population with suspicion of having a particular disease before the test is performed (more emphasis on specificity)
- Performance of a diagnostic test in a low-prevalence population is generally not known

The Need for New Platforms for Diagnostic Assays

- Consider limitations of currently available assays. This may include both sensitivity and timing of “conversion” (window period) to positive test
 - Serologies – may be negative in acute infection (up to weeks in normal host)
 - Antigen tests (HBsAg, respiratory viruses) – not available for all organisms, but highly useful
 - NAT: Nucleic Acid-Amplification Testing – highly sensitive, false + assays common, not available for all pathogens, costly equipment, specialized labs
 - New Assays: Large diagnostic companies may not be interested in creative development for the limited transplant market

Imperfections of NAT

- Cases of West Nile Virus (NY/PA) blood testing on donor was negative by PCR (degraded samples) while tissues were positive in recipients
- LCMV (US, Australia) – virus never detected in donor blood or tissues – even with improved, specific molecular assays – amplified in recipients. Assays for each cluster not useful for general population.

Practical Aspects in Making Lists of Assays for Screening: Complex Matrix of Risk-Benefit

- Epidemiology – changing patterns
- Diagnostic tools (assays) - availability
- Likelihood of infection (virulence) after exposure in transplant recipients
- Disease morbidity/mortality
- Available therapies - toxicity
- Cost, expertise


Flexibility: Changing Epidemiology West Nile Virus

- Neurotropic Flavivirus (family of Japanese viral encephalitis arboviruses)
- Transmitted by mosquitoes (*Culex* spp) & Carried by migratory birds → local birds, marsh and *Culex* (house) mosquitoes
- Causes encephalitis – rate ↑ in transplant




West Nile virus isolated from brain tissue from a crow found in New York City


The Geographic Distribution of Japanese Encephalitis Serocomplex of the Family *Flaviviridae*: *The need for flexibility in assay deployment*



Distribution of West Nile Virus as of October 1999



West Nile Virus 2004



- Rate of infection has dropped nationally – is WNV testing still worth performing?
- Need ability to shift testing paradigm based on epidemiology, patient characteristics

Testing for Strongyloides?

- Relatively non-toxic therapy (ivermectin) at modest cost
- Active disease is quite severe
- Tests are slow (serology) but the risk/benefit is quite good.
- Therefore: Testing is performed but generally treat empirically while awaiting results.

Chagas

- Relatively toxic therapies: nifurtimox and benznidazole. In the USA, these are not FDA approved & are available for treatment only from CDC under investigational protocols (no cost).
- Disease is quite severe and may not be curable (need long term therapy/prophylaxis/immunity)
- Tests are becoming available for blood, but not for organs, sensitivity is an issue. In endemic regions three tests are used for each donor/recipient
- The main risk (from donors) is after cardiac transplantation.
- In some areas (e.g., Miami or Providence or Los Angeles) blood positivity may approach 15%. In others it is ~absent.

LCMV

- Epidemiology may not be helpful – common pathogen of normal hosts
- Tests are slow (CDC-PCR, high throughput sequencing); **virus may not be detectable in donors with available assays**
- Therapy uncertain: benefit of ribavirin?
- Disease may be fatal in transplant recipient
- Therefore: Testing desirable, but not available yet.

Donors from (e.g.) Brazil?

- **Paraccoccidioides**
- **Chagas' Disease** (*Trypanosoma cruzi*)
- **Hepatitis A, B, C**
- **Typhoid, Yellow fever, Dengue**
- **Schistosomiasis, leishmaniasis**
- **Malaria, Filariasis**
- **Rabies**
- **HHV-8 (KSHV)**

HHV-8 Transmission

- Increasing in Europe (Italy), endemic regions
- French Study: 2001 to 2006 (3 years of inclusion and 3 year of follow up) in renal transplantation. The prevalence of HHV8+ donors and recipients was 1.08% and 3.24%
- D+/R-
 - 1 of 64 developed severe clinical HHV-8 infection with cytopenia, fever and hemophagocytosis
 - Two patients developed KS with low HHV-8 viremia
 - **Seroconversion to positive HHV-8 status was documented in 24.8% of D+/R- over three years.**


What's Coming?

Where might donor screening go?







- Eastern Equine Encephalitis
- Japanese Encephalitis
- Dengue, Chikungunya virus (e.g., in Italy)
- Avian Influenza, Swine Influenza
- Others?
- **Transplant recipients as sentinels for new outbreaks, emerging infections, bioterrorism**

High-Throughput Sequencing Method

G. Palacios et al, NEJM 358: 991




Primera ViraQuant Assay: Quantitative Detection of Multiple Viral Targets




T₂: Technology-Nanoparticles

Nanoparticles are composed of an iron oxide metal core covered with dextran polymer. These are in turn functionalized with a detection moiety (in this case, an antibody recognizing a virus).



Courtesy of T₂ Biosystems

Multiplexed Detection




Cell

Virus


Protein

DNA

Multiplexing
inside cartridge




Test A
Test B
Test C
Test D



Communication: Initials

- **DTAC: Disease Transmission Advisory Committee** – reviews reports and recommend policy for Donor-Derived infection and malignancy (Policy 4.0: **REPORTING OF POTENTIAL DONOR-DERIVED RECIPIENT DISEASES OR MEDICAL CONDITIONS**)
- **TTSN: Transplant Transmission Sentinel Network** - a web-based reporting system under development by contract from CDC to UNOS track infections in tissue/organ/eye transplantation
- Under development

Tracking/Communication



Donor-derived infection

REPORTING

Clinical Syndrome in Recipient

Considerations

- What frequency of disease in the community or donor pool justifies routine donor screening? 1%? 5%? 10%?
- Why are bloods and tissues tested more rigorously than organs? Should the FDA regulate and certify all testing?
- Do we want to test based on country of origin? Known risk factors (e.g., what does someone infected with HIV look like)?
- How to best diagnose latent TB (systemic)? Strongyloidiasis (GI)? Histoplasmosis (Lung)? Toxoplasmosis (CNS)? Chagas' (blood)?
- What needs to be communicated from the OPO to clinical centers? And how?

What are the lessons?

- New pathogens can be detected using molecular and immunological techniques – sensitivity/specificity/availability not yet adequate for routine screening
 - Need new assay platforms
 - Need assays designed for donor screening
- Development of list for testing must include consideration of the nature and severity of the disease and implications for therapy

- Need rapid coordination of information (CDC, Public Health Authorities, clinical centers, patients)
- Need transparency of reporting to achieve safety for our patients.

H1N1 Guidelines

- H1N1 is pandemic (incubation 2-7 days)
 - How many are asymptomatic?
 - How many are viremic? (estimate: “many”)
- Potential donors who have “flu-like illness” (fever, sore throat) \leq 2 weeks of death \rightarrow deferred from lung or bowel donation.
- Donors treated with antiviral agents (48 hours? 5 days?) with an effective agent (oseltamavir or zanamivir) are probably OK for other organs.
- Recipients need treatment with antivirals.



MASSACHUSETTS
GENERAL HOSPITAL
TRANSPLANT CENTER

I would be happy to answer
any questions.



If I can help:
jfishman@partners.org